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 “While Mr Samuel said he supported Sony’s right to crack down on the sale of pirated 
PlayStation games, he was critical of the fact that Australians now could not legally use games 
they had bought overseas, sometimes at lower prices than were available locally.” Australian 
Financial Review Friday 1st August 2003, p 24 – “ACCC attacks Sony victory” 
 
The long running litigation between Sony and Sydney businessman Eddie Stevens is 
set to reach some degree of finality in the High Court of Australia later this year.  It 
will be a landmark judgment that will have a significant impact on the rights of 
Australian consumers (of digital entertainment products) but will also fit into a global 
agenda on reconciling the rights of copyright owners and users.  It is fair to suggest 
that like the Gutnick judgment1 this decision will be noticed around the world and 
once again the High Court will be called on to show guidance and leadership on these 
issues.  
1. Background2 
Stevens was sued by Sony pursuant to the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
Copyright Act for modifying the Sony PlayStation 2 (PS2) computer games platform 
or console to allow it more functionality.  Anti-circumvention law has been embedded 
into copyright law around the world and aims to stop people circumventing 
technological measures used to protect copyright.3  It is a direct response to the fear 
that the digital networks of the Internet would mean of the death of copyright. 
 
The Technology 
 
                                                
1
 Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56; B Fitzgerald, “Dow Jones & Company Inc v 
Gutnick [2002] HCA 56: Negotiating American Legal Hegemony in the Transnational World of 
Cyberspace” (2003) 27 Melbourne University LR 590; B. Fitzgerald, G. Middleton, A. Fitzgerald, 
Jurisdiction and the Internet (2004) Thomson/LBC Sydney 
 
2 B Fitzgerald, “The Mod Chip is not a Circumvention Device under Australian Copyright Law: 
Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2002] FCA 906” (2002) 6 Southern Cross 
University Law Review 354. 
 
3 Implementing art 11 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 (WCT) and art 18 WIPO Performers and 
Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT). See further: Universal City Studios Inc v Corley 273 F.3d 429 (2nd 
Cir. 2001) 
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The Sony PlayStation is one of the most popular computer games consoles or 
platforms in the world. When a person wants to play a game they insert a disc into the 
PlayStation much like inserting a musical disc into a CD player.  The PlayStation is 
coded (through what is called Regional Access Coding (RAC) contained within a 
track on each CD read by a chip known as a “Boot ROM” located on the circuit board 
of the PlayStation console (hereafter called “RAC/Boot Rom”)) to play games 
available in the region in which the PlayStation was sold.  This means that a game 
purchased in the USA or Japan cannot be played on a PlayStation purchased in 
Australia; the platform will not support it. As well a copied, burnt or unauthorised 
version of a game will not play on the PlayStation, as the copying process does not 
embed the necessary coding in the copy. As a consequence of consumers seeking 
greater choice of digital products or digital diversity4, a device known as the “mod 
chip” or “converter” surfaced in the market place. It extended the functionality of the 
PlayStation allowing games from other regions as well as copied, unauthorised or 
burnt games to be played on the PlayStation.  
 
Sony’s Claims of Infringement  
 
Eddie Stevens was involved in the computer games industry in Sydney where it was 
alleged he sold unauthorised or copied Sony PlayStation games and also sold and/or 
supplied mod chips.     
 
In particular Sony argued: 
 
1. Stevens had engaged in trademark infringement: because on some of the 
unauthorised copies of the games that were sold by Stevens, the Sony 
trademark still appeared when the games were booted up in the PlayStation 
console. Sackville J at first instance was satisfied that on the evidence before 
him trademark infringement was established.5   
2. Stevens was engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct under s 42 Fair 
Trading Act 1987 (NSW).  Sackville J held that this was not supported by the 
facts, as the people who purchased the unauthorised copies of the games knew 
that Stevens was not holding himself out as being endorsed by Sony to sell 
those games.  People buying these games knew that the games were 
unauthorised copies.6  This was not pursued on appeal. 
3. Stevens had breached s 116A of the Copyright Act 1968 in that he had sold or 
distributed a circumvention device, namely mod chips, which he knew or 
ought reasonably have known would be used as a circumvention device. A 
circumvention device as defined by the Copyright Act, is something that has 
little other purpose than to circumvent a technological protection measure 
(TPM). A technological protection measure is something that is designed to 
prevent access to, or copying of copyright subject matter.  For instance, a 
password or access code making it possible to access copyright subject matter 
or a copy control mechanism. In this case the mod chips were alleged to have 
                                                
4 B. Fitzgerald, “Intellectual Property Rights in Digital Architecture (including Software): The 
Question of Digital Diversity?” [2001] EIPR 121 
5 [2002] FCA 906 at  [64-5] 
6 [2002] FCA 906 at  [73] 
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the purpose of circumventing Regional Access Coding - as activated by the 
Boot Rom - the technological protection measure.7 
 
The Digital Agenda Amendments: Anti-Circumvention Law  
 
This was the first case to consider the anti-circumvention law introduced by the 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda Act) 2000. Section 116A Copyright Act, 
effective 4th March 2001, introduced the anti-circumvention notion enshrined in art 11 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) into Australian law.  The section states: 
 
Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), this section applies if:  
(a)  a work or other subject-matter is protected by a technological 
protection  measure; and  
(b) a person does any of the following acts without the permission of 
the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright in the work or 
other subject-matter:  
(i) makes a circumvention device capable of circumventing, 
or facilitating the circumvention of, the technological 
protection measure; 
(ii) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for 
sale or hire or otherwise promotes, advertises or markets 
such a circumvention device; 
(iii) distributes such a circumvention device for the purpose of 
trade, or for any other purpose that will affect 
prejudicially the owner of the copyright;  
(iv)  exhibits such a circumvention device in public by way of 
trade;  
(v)  imports such a circumvention device into Australia for the 
purpose of:  
(A)  selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering 
or exposing for sale or hire or otherwise promoting, 
advertising or marketing, the device; or  
(B)  distributing the device for the purpose of trade, or 
for any other purpose that will affect prejudicially the 
owner of the copyright; or  
(C)  exhibiting the device in public by way of trade;  
(vi)  makes such a circumvention device available online to an 
extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright;  
(vii)  provides, or by way of trade promotes, advertises or 
markets, a circumvention service capable of 
circumventing, or facilitating the circumvention of, the 
technological protection measure; and  
(iv) the person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that 
the device or service would be used to circumvent, or 
                                                
7 [2002] FCA 906 at  [24] 
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facilitate the circumvention of, the technological 
protection measure. 
  
A technological protection measure (TPM) is defined under s 10 (1) Copyright Act 
as: 
 
A device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that is 
designed, in the ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the 
infringement of copyright in a work or other subject-matter by either or both 
of the following means:  
(a) by ensuring that access to the work or other subject matter is available 
solely by use of an access code or process (including decryption, 
unscrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject-matter) 
with the authority of the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright;  
(b) through a copy control mechanism.  
 
A circumvention device is also defined in s 10 (1) Copyright Act as: 
 
A device (including a computer program) having only a limited commercially 
significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the 
circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an technological 
protection measure. 
 
Section 116A (5) creates the civil cause of action against the infringer: 
 
If this section applies, the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright may 
bring an action against the person. 
 
 
II. The Decision at First Instance 
 
The First Instance Decision in the Federal Court on s 116A – RAC/Boot Rom is not a 
TPM and Therefore the Mod Chip is not a Circumvention Device 
 
At first instance Sackville J held that Regional Access Coding (RAC)/Boot Rom was 
not a technological protection measure because it did not and was not designed to 
prevent access to the copyright content or to act as a copy control mechanism of the 
copyright content. The crucial finding being that RAC/Boot Rom did not prevent 
reproduction of a game, it only prevented use of a game that was not coded for the 
region in which the PlayStation was sold.8  Therefore, the mod chip could not be a 
circumvention device because it was not designed for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological protection measure.9  Sackville J rejected the argument that RAC/Boot 
                                                
8 [2002] FCA 906 at  [92, 118] 
9 cf. Sony v Gamemasters 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sony Computer Entertainment v Owen 
[2002] EWHC 45; Sony v Ball [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch); B Esler, “Judas or Messiah: The Implication 
of the Mod Chip Cases for Copyright in an Electronic Age” (2004) 1 Hertfordshire L J 1 
http://perseus.herts.ac.uk/uhinfo/library/u20277_3.pdf 
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Rom had the “practical effect” of inhibiting or preventing access or copying in that it 
created a disincentive for copying by making it difficult for copied games to be 
played. He explained: 
 
There seems to be nothing in the legislative history to support the view that a 
technological measure is to receive legal protection from circumvention 
devices if the only way in which the measure prevents or inhibits the 
infringement of copyright is by discouraging infringements of copyright 
which predate the attempt to gain access to the work or to copy it.10   
 
However the Judge did comment that if RAC/Boot Rom were a TPM then the mod 
chip would have satisfied the definition of a circumvention device.11 Further, Justice 
Sackville rejected a submission from the ACCC that in order for a device to be a 
“technological protection measure”, its sole purpose must be to prevent or inhibit 
infringement of copyright, noting that a TPM may have a dual purpose.12 
 
The more complex argument made by Sony was that RAC/Boot Rom was a TPM 
because it prevented copies of the games being made in the RAM (Random Access 
Memory) or temporary memory of the PlayStation console.13  The Judge rejected this 
argument predominantly on the basis that reproduction in RAM was of such a limited 
and temporary nature that it was not reproduction “in a material form” as required by 
s 31 (1) (a) (i) Copyright Act.14   
 
Sony continued this line of reasoning and alleged that playing Playstation games 
created a copy of a cinematographic film in RAM. This argument was also rejected,  
explicitly on the ground that a substantial part of the film was not copied in RAM and 
implicitly because the film was not “embodied” in RAM.15   
 
The reasoning of Sackville J in Stevens along with that of Emmett J of the Federal 
Court in Australian Video Retailers Association v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd16 
establish a principle that reproduction of a computer program in RAM will not be 
regarded as an infringing reproduction for the purposes of the Copyright Act unless it 
is reproduced in a manner and on a technology that will allow that temporary 
reproduction to be captured and further reproduced.17 The message being that 
                                                                                                                                       
 
10 [2002] FCA 906 at  [117] 
11 [2002] FCA 906 at  [167] 
12 [2002] FCA 906 at [104] 
13 [2002] FCA 906 at  [119 ff] 
14 [2002] FCA 906 at  [137] 
15
  [2002] FCA 906 at [158]-[160] 
16 (2001) 53 IPR 242 at 262-3 
17 [2002] FCA 906 at  [137, 147-8, 150] This position has now changed as a result of  Article 17.4.1 of 
the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement which obliges Australia to enact laws giving copyright owners 
the right to prohibit all types of reproduction, in any manner or form, permanent or temporary. This  
change is implemented under the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) which 
came into effect on 1 January 2005. The Act amends the definition of ‘material form’ and ‘copy’ in 
section 10 of the Act and creates an exception to infringement where the reproduction is made as part 
of the technical process of using a non-infringing copy of the copyright material (see ss 43B and 111B). 
The critical difference being that temporary reproduction of a whole or substantial part of a computer 
program (game) or film (game) in RAM generated from an infringing copy of the copyright material 
will be unlawful. 
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“use/playing” of a computer game is not of itself an infringement under the Copyright 
Act.   This seems to be the case regardless of whether a computer game is seen to be 
software under Part III of the Copyright Act or a cinematographic film under Part IV 
of the Copyright Act.18  
 
Under Part III, the principle enunciated by Justice Sackville is reinforced by the 
express provision in s 47B, which allows certain temporary reproductions in the 
course of normal use of a computer program, although reproduction from an 
infringing copy of the program is not excused or exempted. Under Part IV, Stevens 
and Warner, suggest the principle of allowing temporary copying in RAM is to be 
implied solely as a matter of statutory interpretation of s 86(a) Copyright Act.19  
 
It should be noted that the approach adopted by Sackville J prevents the content 
owner from using the temporary reproduction in RAM, which inevitably occurs when 
using a computer, as the basis of an action for copyright infringement.20 The ability to 
take an action based on this temporary reproduction in RAM per se, would in essence 
allow copyright owners the right to control the use, reading or viewing of the digital 
material.21   
 
 
III. The Decision of the Appeal Court 
 
The Full Federal Court – RAC/Boot Rom is a TPM and the Mod Chip is a 
Circumvention Device 
 
 
On 30 July 2003, the Full Federal Court of Australia (French, Lindgren and 
Finkelstein JJ) overturned the decision of Sackville J at first instance, and held that the 
sale and distribution of PlayStation mod chips contravened s116A of the Copyright 
Act. The Court held that Regional Access Coding (RAC) embedded on PlayStation 
Games and activated by the Boot Rom chip on the circuit board of the PlayStation 
console was a technological protection measure for the purposes of s 116A Copyright 
Act even though it did not prevent copying as such but merely provided a disincentive 
for copying or burning games – the so called “practical effect argument”.22 
 
In the words of Lindgren J: 
 
If, as in the present case, the owner of copyright in a computer program 
devises a technological measure which has the purpose of inhibiting 
infringement of that copyright, the legislature intended that measure to be 
protected (subject to any express exception), even though the inhibition is 
indirect and operates prior to the hypothetical attempt at access and the 
hypothetical operation of the circumvention device. By ensuring that access to 
                                                
18 Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 81.   
19 Australian Video Retailers Association v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd (2001) 53 IPR 242 at 254-5 
cited in [2002] FCA 906 at  [158]; Stevens  [2002] FCA 906 at  [158, 161] 
20
 Amendments to the Copyright Act made pursuant to the AUSFTA will make this actionable where 
infringing copyright material is reproduced in RAM: see footnote 16. 
21 J Litman, “The Exclusive Right to Read” (1994) 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 29. 
22
 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 at [20], [139], [189]. 
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the program is not available except by use of the Boot ROM, or the access 
code embedded in the PlayStation games, or both in combination, Sony's 
measure does inhibit the infringement of copyright in the PlayStation games in 
that way. 23  
 
 
Likewise French J explained: 
 
If a device such as an access code on a CD-ROM in conjunction with a Boot 
ROM in the PlayStation console renders the infringing copies of computer 
games useless, then it would prevent infringement by rendering the sale of the 
copy “impracticable or impossible by anticipatory action”.24 
 
 
However in obiter the majority (French and Lindgren JJ, Finkelstein J dissenting) 
supported Sackville J’s holding that playing a PlayStation game and reproducing it 
temporarily in the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the PlayStation console  did 
not amount to a reproduction in a material form for the purposes of the Copyright 
Act.25 Once again in obiter the majority (French and Lindgren JJ, Finkelstein J 
dissenting) supporting Sackville J’s decision, apparently with slightly different 
reasoning,  held that there is not a copy of cinematographic film made in RAM when 
a game is played, because there is no “embodiment in an article” as defined by ss 10 
and  24 Copyright Act.26 
 
Statutory Interpretation 
 
Sackville J at first instance and French J on appeal approached the meaning of 
‘technological protection measure’ by looking at the plain and clear words of the 
statute. Lindgren J (with whom Finkelstein J agreed on this point) on the other hand 
found ambiguity and devoted a significant amount of his judgment looking back at 
CLRC Reports, the Digital Agenda Discussion Paper, International Law, Exposure 
Drafts, Parliamentary Committee Reports and the Second Reading speech pursuant to 
s 15 AB Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).27  
 
 
The Issues Facing the High Court 
At the heart of what the High Court must decide is the growing concern that the 
liberty of citizens in the digital environment is being more heavily circumscribed than 
in real space in the name of copyright protection.  The key issue will revolve around 
the interpretation of the statutory definition of ‘technological protection measure’ and 
the merit of the “practical effect argument”: that RAC/Boot Rom is a TPM because it 
has the practical effect of inhibiting infringement of copyright. 
 
                                                
23 Per Lindgren J at [139]  
24 At [20]; 
25 At [168] [26]; cf  [208-210]  
26 At [181-3], [26]; cf. [222-4] 
27 On statutory interpretation in the intellectual property context generally, see: Network Ten Pty 
Limited v TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited [2004] HCA 14 
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The more we explore the science of statutory interpretation the more we realise that it 
is not exact – is not a simple practice of literal understanding but a broader 
appreciation of “law in context”. From the works of Karl Llewellyn and Julius Stone 
on “leeways of choice”28 through McHugh JA’s (as he then was) encapsulating 
statement of the modern approach in Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd29 to Kirby J’s recent 
pronouncements such as those in Dossett v TKJ Nominees Pty Ltd 30 we come to 
understand that in many instances two or more meanings of a statutory configuration 
of words may be possible. As Kirby J explains: 
 
It is increasingly accepted that, in contested matters of statutory interpretation, 
there will often be persuasive arguments in favour of competing conclusions. 
In the end, a legal system endorses one interpretation as the correct or 
preferable construction. That is then identified as the only one applicable to 
the contested words. However, it is rare that words themselves, alone, yield 
the preferred outcome. If such disputes are to depend upon considerations 
more substantial than the identity of the decision-makers and their place in the 
judicial hierarchy, it is important that a court such as this should acknowledge 
the problematic nature of the task and seek to identify clearly the 
considerations that have led it to its conclusion. To say this does not mean 
delving into psychological considerations and other like mysteries. However, 
it does mean approaching the task of construction from a perspective that is 
broader than the examination of the words of the statute, armed with a 
dictionary or two. The importance of context for the derivation of meaning has 
been emphasised by this Court both in relation to statutory construction and 
the ascertainment of the meaning of private instruments. I approach the 
present appeal with that instruction in mind.31 (footnotes omitted) 
 
Likewise Gleeson CJ has stressed the role of context:  
 
Meaning is always influenced, and sometimes controlled, by context. The 
context might include time, place, and any other circumstance that could 
rationally assist understanding of meaning32 
 
The role of the Court has been further articulated by the Chief Justice as follows: 
 
The concepts of meaning and intention are related, but distinct. It is not 
presently necessary to distinguish between construction and interpretation. The 
words are often used interchangeably. In the construction or interpretation of a 
                                                
28
 K Llewellyn The Common Law Tradition (1960) Little Brown, Boston; J Stone Legal System and 
Lawyers’ Reasonings (1968) Maitland Publications, Sydney ch 7; Precedent and Law (1985) 
Butterworths, Sydney Ch 4; The Province and Function of Law (1950) Maitland Publications, Sydney 
171-89; A Macadam and John Pyke, Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia  
(1998) Butterworths, Sydney 53 
 
 
 
29
 (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 421-4 
30
 [2003] HCA 69 at [47] [49] 
 
31
 Ibid. at [49] 
32
 Singh v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] HCA 43 at [12] 
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statute, the object of a court is to ascertain, and give effect to, the will of 
Parliament. Courts commonly refer to the “intention of the legislature”. This 
has been described as a “very slippery phrase”, but it reflects the constitutional 
relationship between the legislature and the judiciary. Parliament itself uses 
the word “intention”, in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), as a focal point 
for reference in construing its enactments. Certain words and phrases are said 
to have a certain meaning unless a contrary intention is manifested in a 
particular Act. Parliament manifests its intention by the use of language, and it 
is by determining the meaning of that language, in accordance with principles 
of construction established by the common law and statute, that courts give 
effect to the legislative will. This is a familiar judicial exercise.33 (footnotes 
omitted) 
 
As Kitto J said, references to intention must not divert attention from the text, 
for it is through the meaning of the text, understood in the light of background, 
purpose and object, and surrounding circumstances, that the legislature 
expresses its intention, and it is from the text, read in that light, that intention 
is inferred. The words “intention”, “contemplation”, “purpose”, and “design” 
are used routinely by courts in relation to the meaning of legislation. They are 
orthodox and legitimate terms of legal analysis, provided their objectivity is 
not overlooked.34 
 
The modern approach to statutory interpretation is one that pays respect to the words 
of the statute but justifies meaning to the “interpretive community”35 through a set of 
interpretive rules. The reason for legislating or purpose is dominant but this is in turn 
confined by notions of sensibility and fit along with respect for fundamental liberties 
yet parliamentary supremacy in the end must prevail in the instance of clear words 
subject to the overriding duty to uphold any constitutional imperative.   
 
There seems to have been very little consideration of context and fit in the judicial 
reasoning of the Full Federal Court. Lindgren J spends a great deal of time 
ascertaining purpose yet does not afford much consideration to the context of the 
legislative provision.  In my mind there are at least five arguments Stevens should 
make on appeal denying the legitimacy of the “practical effect” approach. All are 
based on rules of statutory interpretation.  
 
Rule I:  “Consequences cannot alter statutes, but may help fix their meaning”36  
 
Proposition 1: The approach of the Full Federal Court leads to the absurd 
consequence that a lawfully acquired piece of tangible property cannot be 
modified by a commercial provider of such services to allow “interoperability” 
or operation with lawfully acquired accessories. “You mean to say I cannot be 
supplied with new rims on my wheels on which to accommodate these wider and 
safer tyres?”  
                                                
33
 Wilson v Anderson (2002) 213 CLR 401 at 417-419 [8] 
34
 Singh v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] HCA 43 at [19] 
35
 S. Fish, Is There a Text in the Class (1980) Harvard University Press Cambridge Mass. 
36
 Re Rouss (1917) 116 NE 782 per Cardozo J at 785. 
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According to the Full Federal Court decision in Sony v Stevens a lawfully acquired 
PlayStation console (a chattel) cannot be modified by a commercial provider of 
modification services at the owner’s request, in order to allow the machine to operate 
with a lawfully acquired accessory (such as PlayStation game purchased in the USA) 
or to view lawfully acquired content.37 Except for safety considerations where else is 
our right to use/own private property (chattel) so severely restricted in the name of 
other property owners or citizens?38  Zoning of real property is the only analogy. 
 
The proper interpretation of this statute is that it operates in relation to content and not 
at the point of interoperability or co-operation of lawfully acquired assets. The 
approach of Justice Sackville reconciles this dilemma by rejecting the “practical 
effect” test which allows the copyright owner broad compass to reduce the 
functionality of the lawfully acquired PlayStation console. The purpose of the anti-
circumvention provisions of the Copyright Act such as s 116A in implementing art 11 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 (WCT) and art 18 WIPO Performers and Phonograms 
Treaty 1996 (WPPT) is to preserve copyright in the digital environment.  However to 
argue for an interpretation that would seriously encumber the lawful functionality of a 
chattel is a serious departure from the existing state of legal affairs.  While 
proportionality39 has never explicitly been a criterion of statutory interpretation one 
wonders if the caution of Cardozo J reproduced above in essence calls for an 
interpretation to be proportionate with context.  
 
If contrary to the holding of Lindgren J, back up copies can be made of computer 
programs and there are very strong reasons for this counter argument, then the 
reasoning of the Full Court is extraordinary. It would mean a lawfully acquired games 
platform could not be modified to use or implement or operate a lawfully made spare 
or back up copy.  This would be a ridiculous situation in which the copyright owner 
would control far beyond what they need or are entitled to.   
 
The provisions in s 47C(1) Copyright Act allow for the making of a back up copy of a 
computer program if done by or on behalf of the owner or licensee of the copy from 
which the reproduction is made, primarily for the purpose of ensuring that the 
program may be used if the original copy is lost or damaged (see in particular s 
47(1)(c)(ii)).  The provisions do not apply if the back-up copy is made from an 
infringing copy of the program, if the owner of the copyright in the computer program 
has designed the program in a way that copies of it cannot be made without modifying 
the program or if the licence to use the program has expired.40  
                                                
37
 Sony could attempt to licence a game for use only within a territorial area. This would require 
characterisation of the consumer transaction as a licence not a (first) sale and also that 
competition/antitrust law did not invalidate the transaction.  
38
 In relation to patented items there is an implied right to use, and repair and arguably modify, by a 
lawful purchaser of the patented item: Solar Thompson Engineering v Barton [1977] RPC 537; Bottom 
Line Management Inc v Pan Man Inc 228 F. 3d. 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hewlett Packard Co v Repeat-
O-Type Stencil Manufacturing Corp Inc 123 F. 3d. 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Surfco Hawaii v. Fin 
Control Systems Pty, Ltd. 264 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
39
 B Fitzgerald, “Proportionality and Australian Constitutionalism” (1993) 12 University of Tasmania 
Law Review 363; Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; B Fitzgerald, “Characterisation Proportionality 
and Constitutional Legislative Validity” (1995)  (Unpublished manuscript). 
40 Section 47C(4).  Nic Suzor has made the further point. “It may be argued that PlayStation 2 games, 
the Boot ROM and the RAC have been “designed [such] that copies [...]  cannot be made without 
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However the words of Lindgren J in Sony v Stevens41 have cast some doubt on the 
inherent right of a user to make a backup copy of a computer program under Section 
47C.  Following Jacob J’s description of a similar submission in one of the leading 
English cases, Sony v Edmunds as “rather fanciful”,42  Lindgren J stated in Sony that:  
 
It is difficult to conceive of the conditions referred to in subs 47C(1) or (2) 
ever being satisfied in the case of Sony PlayStation games. Implicit in the use 
of the word “licensee” in both subsections is a requirement that the making of 
the copy be permitted by the copyright owner. The making of a copy of a 
PlayStation game lies outside the licence granted by Sony. Subsections 
116A(2)-(4) of the Act set out, by way of exception to subs 116A(1), purposes 
for which a circumvention device may be used. The purpose of making of 
back-up copies is not one of them. Finally, the CLRC Final Report stated (at 
10.17): “The right to make a back-up copy should not extend to copies of 
computer programs that have been ‘locked’ by the copyright owner against the 
making of copies.”43 
 
This interpretation largely negatives the impact of the provision and makes the 
subjective intent of the copyright owner the paramount consideration. With respect 
this interpretation strays too far from the actual words of the section. Is Lindgren J 
suggesting that a consumer that becomes the owner of a copy of the program cannot 
make a back up copy unless the copyright owner agrees? Whether the consumer 
becomes the owner of a copy of the program is a question that must be determined on 
the evidence before the court including the nature of the consumer transaction.44 The 
court would need to consider whether the consumer transaction of buying the game 
resulted in a sale of a copy of the program (not the copyright) or merely a licence of 
the copy.  It is arguable that a consumer purchasing a Sony PlayStation 2 game 
becomes the owner of the copy of the program. 
    
                                                                                                                                       
modifying the program” (s47C(4)), with the   result that back-up copies cannot be lawfully made. It is 
submitted that this argument cannot succeed unless the game itself needs to be modified to make a 
copy. In most cases, the game is not modified to   make a back-up copy - it is directly copied from the 
original medium. The fact that the access code is not copied does not make the resulting copy a 
modified version of the original game - the game and the access code are separate works. Further, a 
requirement that something be done at a later time to another component in order to render a copied 
work useful is not the same act as the prior making of the copy. Section 47C(4) requires that a program 
not be modified in order to make a copy of it, but cannot be extended to a requirement that no machine 
that utilises the copy can be modified, nor should the explicit reference to a copy being made be read 
expansively to include acts that may occur after a copy is made.” Email Correspondence 15/11/04  
41 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 [40], [134] – [137] 
42 Sony Computer Entertainment v Edmunds (t/as Channel Technology) (2002) 55 IPR 429 at  432 per 
Jacob J.  See also Sony v Ball [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch). 
43
 At [135-6]. 
44
 See further: DSC v Pulse Communications Inc 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.1999); B Fitzgerald, 
“Commodifying and Transacting Informational Products Through Contractual Licences: The Challenge 
for Informational Constitutionalism” in CEF Rickett and GW Austin (eds), Intellectual Property and 
the Common Law World,  Oxford,  Hart Pub,  2000, 35; B Fitzgerald, “Commodifying and Transacting 
Informational Products through Contract” (2002) 20 Copyright Reporter 56; C Bartlett and B 
Fitzgerald, “Consuming Digital Entertainment: Key Legal Issues” forthcoming (2005). 
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Regardless of whether you are an owner of a copy or a licensee, s 47H would seem to 
suggest in prohibiting contractual ouster of the back up right, that the copyright owner 
cannot control the right of the owner or licensee of the copy to authorise a back up 
copy in the circumstances stipulated in s 47C.45 At most it could be argued that “or” in 
s 47C means “and” and that the licensee must have permission of the owner of a copy, 
however even this seems to fit awkwardly with the intention of the section.   
 
In short, what is being suggested (contrary to the holding of Lindgren J) is that s 47C 
on its face appears to allow back up copies of computer games acquired through a 
standard consumer transaction, where the owner of the copy of a game or licensee, not 
necessarily the copyright owner, approve.  In other words, s 47C (reinforced by s 
47H) presents as a guarantee of the digital consumer’s liberty/protection against the 
wishes of the copyright owner and any contractual or licence stipulation to the 
contrary.  S 47C read as a consumer protection provision sensibly allows back up 
copies of expensive entertainment items where risk of damage is high. Why should 
the vulnerability of the medium - the CD or DVD - for presenting the entertainment 
be a condition of user or risk that must be born by the consumer when the real value 
of the commodity (what has been paid for) is the material stored on the disk? 
Furthermore the suggestion by Lindgren J that a circumvention device would be 
needed to make a back up copy is hard to accept as that copy can be made regardless 
of RAC nor does it acknowledge the consumer’s rights under the law as it existed at 
the time of this case to engage in actual circumvention.  
 
It must be noted that there is no right to make backup copies in relation to 
cinematographic films. Therefore, the issue arises as to whether computer games, 
which have been deemed to be compositions of computer programs and 
cinematographic films46 should be regarded as computer programs or films, 
remembering films on DVD have been held not to be computer programs.47  The 
better view, reinforced by the approach of the judges in this case, is that computer 
games are computer programs for the purpose of s 47C. 
  
In summary under the Full Federal Court approach the criterion of liability is the 
interoperability of platform and accessory when it should be the infringing of rights in 
the content. To hold otherwise gives the copyright owner enormous influence over the 
way in which lawfully acquired property can be used. 
 
Proposition 2: The approach of the Full Federal Court would mean that recent 
amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 removing restrictions on the parallel 
importation of computer games – Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) 
Act 2003 - would be made ineffectual and redundant as copyright owners can 
simply use Regional Access Coding reinforced by anti- circumvention law to 
segment markets through a technologically imposed restriction on parallel 
importation.  “You say I can walk on the beach for free but interpret the law so 
as to allow beachfront land owners to fence off the dunes”    
 
                                                
45
 B Esler, “Judas or Messiah: The Implication of the Mod Chip Cases for Copyright in an Electronic 
Age” (2004) 1 Hertfordshire L J 1 at 8-9 http://perseus.herts.ac.uk/uhinfo/library/u20277_3.pdf 
 
46 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 [62],[63] 
47 Australian Video Retailers Association Ltd v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 324 
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If RAC is a TPM we have what Professor Lessig might call the operation of  “code as 
law” – that is technology supplants legislation as the primary mode of regulating 
behaviour.48 On the interpretation provided by the Full Federal Court parallel 
importation is in effect coded back into “law” thereby defeating the benefits of greater 
competition that the legislature had intended.49 In repealing restrictions on parallel 
importation in 2003 the legislature could not have intended that these restrictions 
would be reinforced and reimposed through a technological measure given support by 
a statute enacted in 2001. Would it be so careless? The very great concern is that the 
approach of the Full Federal Court defines regional coding - a technological form of 
market segmentation - as a TPM thereby reducing cross market competition in 
copyright products, the very thing the Australian Parliament in 2003 said it wished to 
promote.50  Once again this approach seems to fail the basic consequentialist test 
suggested by Carodozo J and restated above as calling for an “interpretation that is 
proportionate with context.”  
 
And if we are mindful of allowing contract or private ordering to override the policy 
of copyright legislation – see the extensive report of the Copyright Law Review 
Committee Copyright and Contract (2002)51 and s 47H of the Copyright Act - we 
must be alert to the same issues in relation to technology/code.52 A consumer buying a 
computer game sold anywhere in the world would expect as an aspect of digital 
liberty that they should be able to use and view that game in Australia, a country 
where the legislature has deemed it good policy to be able to import copyright games 
without restriction.  
 
In summary the point to be highlighted is that in sponsoring an interpretation that 
facilitates the technological segmentation of the market in digital entertainment 
products worldwide through limiting the ability of the consumer and lawful owner to 
make modifications to the games platform, when the legislature has acted to prevent 
this, is contrary to common sense. The mod chip is a technological bulwark of the 
liberty of digital consumers, yet to hold RAC is a TPM, gives an imprimatur and 
power to copyright owners to engage in conduct that will make markets for digital 
entertainment products less competitive and products more expensive for the 
consumer.  
                                                
48
 L Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) Basic Books NY  
49
 See Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Final Report (2000) www.ipcr.gov.au 
50
 Senate Official Hansard, No 16 2002, Second Reading Speech, Copyright Amendment (Parallel 
Importation) Bill, Senator Coonan, 10 December 2002 : “The central aim of the bill is to improve 
access to a wide range of software products and printed material on a fair, competitive basis by 
permitting the parallel importation of such goods. … The bill offers the prospect of cheaper prices and 
increased availability of products for all Australians, but especially for small businesses, parents and 
the education sector…. Australian consumers and businesses will be able to get the best deal on 
legitimate printed material and software products.” See further: A Fitzgerald and B Fitzgerald 
Intellectual Property in Principle (2004) Thomson Sydney, pp 152-3 
 
 
51
 Available at www.clrc.gov.au 
52
 As mentioned above the extent to which contract can be used to structure a user right or licence that 
limits use in a territorial district in the face of competition law is an interesting question that is yet to be 
fully tested.  
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Rule 2 “It is settled law that a Court should not impute to a legislature an 
intention either to abolish or to modify a common law right or privilege unless 
the relevant legislation makes such an intention unambiguously clear”53 – The 
Coco Rule 
 
 
Proposition 3: The approach of the Full Federal Court ignores the principle 
enunciated throughout the history of the High Court that our common law 
liberty - “the common law rule [is] that “everybody is free to do anything, 
subject only to the provisions of the law”54 – should not be construed to have 
been taken away unless the statute does this by clear words or necessary 
implication.  
 
The fundamental liberty here can be conceptualised in two ways. Firstly the right to 
enjoyment of private property – the PlayStation console and/or the game purchased in 
another region (or depending on the High Court’s approach possibly a back up copy) - 
recognised in the s 51 (31) Constitution, Art 17 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 and the common law, has been taken away without clear words. The 
words making up the definition of technological protection measure do not by clear 
words or necessary implication55 take away the fundamental liberty a person has to 
full enjoyment of their lawfully acquired property. 
 
Secondly the principle of interoperability is fundamental to many things we do in life 
and is reinforced at various points in our legal system.56 My right to choose what tyres 
I wish to have on my car and the ability to have different brands of tyre interoperate 
with my car is in a part a consequences of competition law. Likewise in copyright law 
in Australia57, the US58 and Europe59 the notion of allowing interoperability of 
                                                
53
 Coco v Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 per Deane and Dawson JJ at [2]; see also Mason CJ, Brennan 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ  [9]-[10]; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 96, 116, and 123; Daniels 
Corporation International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543 at 553 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron 
Gummow and Hayne JJ; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 492 [30]; 
Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39 per Gummow and Hayne JJ at [185], per Kirby J at [250] – [251];  
Marquet (2003) 78 ALJR 105 at 133 [160]; Bropho v WA (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 18 per Mason CJ 
Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304;    
Corporate Affairs v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319; A MacAdam and T Smith, Statutes 3rd. ed. 
Butterworths Sydney, p 262; A v Boulton [2004] FCAFC 101; Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37 at 
[19] per Gleeson CJ, [193] per Kirby J, [241] per Hayne J;  Singh at [19] per Gleeson CJ.  
54
 Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39 per Kirby J at [253] citing Cunliffe (1994) 182 CLR 272 at 363, 
Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 564 
55
 On this notion see: A v Boulton [2004] FCAFC 101 
56
 On interoperability as a key principle of government IT policy see: AGIMO, OSS Position Paper 31 
August 2004 <http://www.agimo.gov.au/infrastructure/oss>  ; Australian Government, 
Interoperability: Technical Framework for the Australian Government (June 2003) www.agimo.gov.au  
 
57
 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth),  s47D, as amended by Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act 
1999 (Cth); Anne Fitzgerald and Cristina Cifuentes “Pegging Out the Boundaries of Computer 
Software Copyright: The Computer Programs Act and the Digital Agenda Bill”  in A Fitzgerald, B 
Fitzgerald, P Cook and C Cifuentes (eds) Going Digital 2000: Legal Issues for E Commerce Software 
and the Internet Prospect Media, Sydney, Australia (2000) 
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platform and product – largely for reasons of prospering competition and digital 
diversity - is facilitated by the various copyright laws allowing reproduction of 
software for the purpose of developing interoperable products.60 Interoperability is a 
fundamental or core principle of the digital environment making up one of the handful 
of key principles of what I broadly term “digital constitutionalism”61 of which digital 
liberty and digital diversity are subsets.  The Dworkinian notion of a principle is of a 
broad based concept that mediates power relations and finds more precise 
embodiment in rules.62  The approach of the Full Federal Court does not appear to be 
informed by any respect for this fundamental principle of interoperability. In fact the 
interpretation endorsed privileges the rights of the copyright owner at the expense of 
the notion of interoperability in the absence of clear words or necessary implication in 
the definition of technological protection measure. Nowhere does the notion of 
“inhibiting infringement” expressly or by necessary implication evince an intention to 
deny the  interoperability of lawfully acquired products.. 
 
It is worthwhile to note that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal when recently asked 
to interpret similar yet different legislation enacted in the US to implement Art 11 
WCT as was s 116A Copyright Act, was at pains to point out that in enacting the 
DMCA, “Congress attempted to balance the legitimate interests of copyright owners 
with those of consumers of copyrighted products …The DMCA does not create a new 
property right for copyright owners. Nor, for that matter, does it divest the public of 
the property rights that the Copyright Act has long granted to the public”.63  In other 
words we must look very closely at any claim that anti-circumvention laws encumber 
the right to full enjoyment of lawfully acquired property in furtherance of the rights of 
copyright owners.    
 
Further an amici curiae brief filed by US Intellectual Property Law Professors 
(convened by Professor Peter Jaszi) in Davidson and Associates Inc v Internet 
Gateway Inc (ED Missouri)64 - a case currently on appeal to the 8th Circuit looking at 
the contractual ousting of reverse engineering rights in relation to software - argues 
that “privileges for reverse engineering are pro-consumer and pro-competitive. They 
help to assure that more and better products and services are available to consumers 
and to assure that copyright owners do not succeed in leveraging their limited rights 
into something that they were never intended to enjoy ….”65 Similar arguments can 
and have been made here in relation to the mod chip. The amici curiae brief also 
highlights how arguments based on copyright misuse are being made in US courts in 
                                                                                                                                       
58
 Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade, Inc. 977 F. 2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony v Connectix58 203 F. 3d 
596 (9th Circ 2000); Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA) s 1201 (f) (4) 
 
59
 Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs Directive 91/250 OJ 1991 L122/42, art 6 
60
 B. Fitzgerald, “Intellectual Property Rights in Digital Architecture (including Software): The 
Question of Digital Diversity?” [2001] EIPR 121 
61
 B Fitzgerald, “Software as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property in Digital Architecture” 
(2000) 18 Cardozo Journal of Arts and Entertainment Law 337  - Part IV - “Power and The New 
Constitutionalism” at 382-5;  B Fitzgerald, “Digital Property: The Ultimate Boundary?” (2001) 7 Roger 
Williams University Law Review 47 at 143ff. 
62
 R Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) Fontana London; Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37 at f/n 64  and 
[69] per McHugh J. 
63
 The Chamberlain Group Inc v Skylink Technologies Inc  381 F.3d 1178 at 1203, 1204 (Fed Cir. 
2004)  
64
 On the history of this case see: http://www.eff.org/IP/Emulation/Blizzard_v_bnetd 
65
 Dated 21/2/04 - available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Emulation/Blizzard_v_bnetd 
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the face of claims that the exclusive rights of the copyright owner can override 
privileges held by consumers and citizens to facilitate diversity of thought, choice and 
life.66 
 
 
Rule 3 – “A judge-made rule is legitimate only when it can be effectively 
integrated into the mass of principles, rules and standards which constitute the 
common law and equity.  A rule which will not "fit" into the general body of the 
established law cannot be the subject of judge-made law.”67  
 
 
Proposition 4: The approach of the Full Federal Court does not fit with the 
existing body of principles within the Australian legal landscape.  
 
While McHugh J’s adoption of the Dworkian68 “fit” principle is enunciated in the 
context of judicial law making of the common law (in the strong sense) there can be 
little doubt that statutory interpretation is also an act of judicial law making (in the 
weak sense) and must be guided by the interpretive rule requiring “fit”.69 The 
interpretation of the Full Federal Court fits uneasily with recent amendments to the 
Copyright Act concerning parallel importation (as outlined above). An interpretation 
that reinforces anti-competitive technological market segmentation in the face of the 
Parliament’s wish to lift restrictions on parallel importation of copyright products like 
computer games is simply “no fit” with established principle.  
 
One must also consider “fit” in the context of competition and  consumer rights 
bestowed upon Australians by legislation such as the Trade Practices Act 1974 and its 
state counterparts. Competition or antitrust law has long been sceptical of product 
tying wherein interoperability and market competition is reduced through tying an 
accessory to the core technology or platform.70  In a sense only being able to utilise 
Australian sold Playstation games with an Australian sold platform ties or locks in the 
accessory to the platform with the very real potential of a decrease in interoperability 
and consumer welfare, as Australian consumers cannot utilise a cheaper and larger 
variety of games from the USA.  Successfully asserting such an argument in court 
within the parameters of the existing law will be difficult,71 however it is an argument 
(possibly amongst others) the High Court needs to weigh up in its reasoning 
especially in light of the fact that the legislature has moved to open up the 
international market in computer games.  Ultimately the High Court will need to ask 
itself whether the interpretation it endorses facilitates conduct (e.g. regional coding 
                                                
66
 Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin LLC v Wiredata Inc 350 F. 3d. 640 (7th Cir. 2003); D. Burk, 
“Anticircumvention Misuse” (2003) 50 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 1095 
67
 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 at 593 per McHugh J. See also Al-
Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37 at [69] per McHugh J. 
 
68R  Dworkin,, Law's Empire (1986) Fontana London, at 228-239 
69
 See further Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 143-4. 
70
 S Corones,  “Technological Tying in the Computer Industry: When Does it Contravene s 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act?” (2003) 3 QUTLJJ http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/ljj/editions/v3n1/corones.jsp  
71
 Consider the responses of Mr Monti of the European Commission dated 14 June 2000 and 28 
September 2000, to the questions of Glyn Ford (MEP) concerning regional coding, DVDs and 
competition <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/ce103/ce10320010403en01380139.pdf>    
 17 
and segmenting markets) that contravenes the Trade Practices Act? That is a question 
of “fit”.  
 
In terms of consumer law,  it could be argued the notion  that a good be suitable for 
the purpose for which it is sold – here to play lawfully acquired games – is ignored by 
the Full Court’s interpretation which allows the purpose of a consumer good to be 
determined by the needs of the copyright owner of an accessory to that good, rather 
than the needs of the consumer.  This suggests the Full Court’s interpretation does not 
“fit” easily with basic elements of consumer law.   
 
 
Rule 4 - “The protection of intellectual property rights must be afforded in a 
constitutional setting which upholds other values of public good in a 
representative democracy.”72 
 
Proposition 5 – It is unconstitutional to legislate intellectual property rights for  
the benefit of the copyright owner, that extinguish the power of the owner of a 
lawfully acquired chattel to modify it and use it as they wish.   
 
This proposition is based on either an inherent limit on intellectual property rights 
derived from core democratic principles or it finds support in s 51 (31) Constitution.  
 
Many of these arguments are rehearsed in a slightly different form above. However 
what must be highlighted here is that the right to hold property is a fundamental 
principle of democratic existence. In essence a stable system of holding and 
recognising property entitlements is foundational to the workings of the Australian 
democratic system.  The approach of the Full Federal Court ignores the pre-existing 
entitlements of the consumer who has lawfully acquired the PlayStation and the game 
accessory in favour of expanding the reach of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner.  This is very much a loss/gain scenario – a form of unjust enrichment - that 
may well fall foul of s 51 (31).73 
 
 
Emerging Principle : Reconciling Property Rights 
 
The US decisions in Chamberlain74 (the garage door) and Lexmark75 (the printer) 
highlight how much software is now embodied in daily life and more specifically the 
physical environment that we inhabit. If we can locate software in almost anything 
                                                
72
 Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth [2000] HCA 14 at f/n 218 per Kirby J 
73
 B Fitzgerald, “Unjust Enrichment As A Principle of Australian Constitutionalism” (1995) available at 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp ; B Fitzgerald, “Ownership as the Proximity 
or Privity Principle in Unjust Enrichment” (1995) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 166; 
Georgiadis v. AOTC (1994) 179 CLR 297); Mutual Pools & Staff Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1994) 179 
CLR. 155; Health Insurance Commission v. Peverill (1994) 179 CLR. 226; Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. 
v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513; Smith v ANL (2000) 204 CLR 493; Air Services Australia v 
Canadian Airlines International Ltd [1999] HCA 62  
 
74
 The Chamberlain Group Inc v Skylink Technologies Inc  381 F.3d 1178 at 1203, 1204 (Fed Cir. 
2004) 
75
 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,  387 F.3d 522; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 27422 
(6th Cir 2004) 
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that has mechanical operation then we have broad scope for the application of anti-
circumvention laws as the copyright owner can code a TPM into the mechanical 
process.  The worrying aspect of this occurrence is that a TPM may have more than 
one purpose and therefore could be used with the sanction of copyright law to limit 
user rights in a less than desirable manner, such as segmenting the international 
market for computer games.  
 
While detailed legal reasoning prevented liability in the two US cases I would suggest 
a more fundamental principle is at play. Where a person owns tangible property – eg a 
printer, garage door or games console – they should have the right to use that property 
to its fullest enjoyment whether in buying generic garage door openers or printer 
cartridges or modifying it to play a wider variety of games from the US.  More so, 
where a TPM is implicated in the process of user and one of the purposes of the TPM 
is motivated by an anti-competitive desire, the rights of the tangible property owner 
should be protected.  If this does not occur the right to private property and the 
rationale for competition or antitrust law inherent in democratic society is severely 
undermined.  
 
I would submit the following principle has emerged and should be used as a guide to  
the interpretation of anti-circumvention law:  
 
If the TPM has more than one purpose and  
 
a) one of those purposes has an anti competitive effect and 
b) there is a competing (vis a vis the exclusive rights of the copyright owner) 
right to use a lawfully acquired  tangible item of property e.g. a garage door, 
printer or games console and 
c) it is being argued that  use of the lawfully acquired tangible item should be 
restricted on the basis of anti-circumvention law    
 
then a court should be inclined, so far as interpretation of the law will allow,  to reject 
the anti-circumvention claim.76 
 
While competition or anti-trust law is not constitutional law it is fundamental to the 
structure of our society and must be closely considered when determining the 
boundaries of digital property.77 In this sense where the restriction of a person’s 
enjoyment of their lawfully acquired property is motivated by anti-competitive desire 
we must closely scrutinise the attempt to further consolidate such a desire through 
anti-circumvention law.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                
76
 See an Italian decision (Court of Bolzano) on the legality of the mod chip, reinforcing this approach, 
at:  http://www.alcei.it/english/actions/psmodchip.htm I acknowledge Olivier Oosterbaan for bringing this case to 
my attention.  See also ACCC, “Submission to the Digital Agenda Review” (2003) at 
http://www.phillipsfox.com/whats_on/Australia/DigitalAgenda/submissions/ACCC_submission.pdf. 
77
 B Fitzgerald, “Digital Property: The Ultimate Boundary?” (2001) 7 Roger Williams University Law 
Review 47 
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The decision of the Full Federal Court in Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer 
Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 provides for an alarming alteration of 
consumer rights within Australia. Its effect is to say that a consumer cannot modify 
the capacity of a lawfully acquired machine (PS2) in order to use, read or play a 
lawfully acquired PS2 game. If we uphold such a principle  from the outset we destine 
any mature notion of digital liberty (including diversity) to the proverbial dustbin.  
The challenge is now set for the High Court to conceptualise and begin to map out the 
boundaries of digital liberty. At a general level, we must argue that our liberties in the 
digital environment should be no worse off than they are in real space.78 As the 
foregoing explains basic interpretative principles (and potentially constitutional 
doctrine) dictate nothing less in this case.  
 
 
*This research has been undertaken pursuant to a QUT Strategic Collaborative Grant 
designed to enhance cross disciplinary research across the Faculties of Law, IT and 
Creative Industries. I owe thanks to: Alastair Macadam, Nic Suzor, Liam Chambers, 
John Pyke, Cheranne Bartlett, Fred von Lohmann, Quentin Cregan, Andrew Cameron, 
and Mark Byrne. 
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